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Has U.S. Investment Abroad
Become More Sensitive
to Tax Rates?
Rosanne Altshuler, Harry Grubert,
and T. Scott Newlon
This paper attempts to address two related questions. The ﬁrst question
is how sensitive U.S. ﬁrms’ investment location decisions are to tax rate
diﬀerences across countries. Finding the answer to this question clearly is
important for determining the revenue and eﬃciency consequences of
many tax policies. The second question is whether the location of invest-
ment abroad by U.S. ﬁrms has become more sensitive to tax rate diﬀer-
ences across countries. A ﬁnding that investment location decisions have
become more sensitive to tax rates would be consistent with the view that
technological advances and the loosening of trade restrictions and capital
controls have in recent years increased the ease with which capital can
cross national borders. If diﬀerent locations became closer substitutes for
the location of production, it would not be surprising if investment loca-
tion decisions became increasingly responsive to tax considerations.
We use data from the U.S. Department of the Treasury corporate tax
return ﬁles for 1984 and 1992 to address these questions. The use of these
data yields two beneﬁts not available to recent cross-sectional studies of
the eﬀect of host-country tax rates on the distribution of U.S. direct invest-
ment abroad (e.g., Grubert and Mutti 1991, 1997; and Hines and Rice
1994). The ﬁrst beneﬁt is that, with the time element in our data, we can
examine whether investment location choices abroad have in fact become
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9more sensitive to tax rates over the period spanned by our two sample
years. The second beneﬁt is that we can control for unmeasured country
ﬁxed eﬀects.
Our data come from the information forms ﬁled with the tax returns of
U.S. parent corporations on each controlled foreign corporation (CFC)
abroad.1 This information form, to be described more fully later, includes
details from the balance sheets and income statements of CFCs. We aggre-
gate these data up to country level and combine it with information from
a variety of other sources to control for nontax features of diﬀerent loca-
tions. The data include information for almost sixty countries. We limit
our analysis to the manufacturing CFCs of U.S. manufacturing parents.
Following the earlier studies by Grubert and Mutti (1991, 1997) and
Hines and Rice (1994), we regress a measure of U.S. multinational ﬁrms’
real capital in each country on tax rate variables and measures of nontax
characteristics of each country. The focus is on the eﬀe c to fd i ﬀerences in
host-country tax rates on investment choices across foreign locations, not
on the choice between investing at home or abroad. Our work has two
main ﬁndings. First, we ﬁnd large estimated tax elasticities for investment
abroad. Controlling for country ﬁxed eﬀects produces tax elasticities that
are slightly larger and more precisely estimated than those from our single-
year cross sections. Second, our results suggest that the location of real
capital in manufacturing aﬃliates has become more sensitive to tax rates
in the period from 1984 to 1992. Our basic estimates indicate that the elas-
ticity of real capital to changes in after-tax returns increased from about
1.5 in 1984 to 2.8 in 1992 (for countries with the most open trade regimes).
Both the elasticities and the diﬀerence between them are statistically sig-
niﬁcant at standard levels.
We perform a variety of tests to check the robustness of our elasticity
estimates. With few exceptions, the magnitude and signiﬁcance of our 1992
and 1984 elasticities changes little when we screen our sample in various
ways or change the measure of host-country taxes. The diﬀerence between
the 1984 and 1992 elasticities is large in absolute terms and is statistically
signiﬁcant; and its absolute and statistical signiﬁcance is robust to our
sensitivity checks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 contains
a brief review of studies using cross-sectional data to estimate tax eﬀects
on location decisions of U.S. multinational corporations. We highlight the
elasticity estimates in previous studies and note that they provide sugges-
tive but inconclusive evidence that investment location has become more
sensitive to tax rates in recent years. Section 1.2 describes the data and
1. A CFC is a foreign corporation that is at least 50 percent owned by a group of U.S.
shareholders, each of whom has at least a 10 percent interest in the company. In fact, most
of the CFCs in our sample are 100 percent owned by the U.S. parent corporation.
10 Rosanne Altshuler, Harry Grubert, and T. Scott Newlonhow our tax and capital measures are constructed from the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury tax ﬁles. Empirical results are contained in section
1.3, and the ﬁnal section presents our conclusions.
1.1 A Brief Review of the Recent Literature
While early studies of the responsiveness of U.S. direct investment to
after-tax rates of return used aggregate time series data,2 the most recent
work in this area exploits cross-sectional data. In this section, we review
the three studies that relate most directly to our approach: Grubert and
Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice (1994), and Grubert and Mutti (1997). All
three papers contain estimates of the eﬀect of local taxes on the allocation
of real capital. While the tax variable in these papers is similar (each uses a
measure of average eﬀective tax rates), it appears in diﬀerent forms in the
estimating equations, making the comparison of estimated tax eﬀects dif-
ﬁcult.
Both Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) use the 1982
benchmark data on U.S. direct investment abroad from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA). One important diﬀerence between these two pa-
pers is the sample studied. Grubert and Mutti analyze the allocation of
capital by manufacturing aﬃliates of U.S. parents across thirty-three host
countries; the focus of Hines and Rice is on the activity of U.S. multina-
tionals in tax havens. Their sample includes all majority owned nonbank
aﬃliates of U.S. parents, which results in a larger set of countries (seventy-
three), more than half of which (forty-one) are tax havens with little real
capital.3
Grubert and Mutti (1991) regress the log of the net stock of property,
plant, and equipment (PPE) on two diﬀerent forms of the average eﬀective
tax rate: the log of 1 minus the tax rate, and the inverse of the tax rate.
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation gives a (constant) tax elasticity that measures the
sensitivity of the demand for real capital to changes in after-tax returns
(for a given pretax return) or, alternatively, to changes in the cost of capital
(for given after-tax returns). The second speciﬁcation allows for larger tax
eﬀects at lower tax rates. Using the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, Grubert and Mutti
estimate tax elasticities that range from 1.5 (for all manufacturing aﬃli-
ates) to 2 (for majority owned manufacturing aﬃliates) but that were sta-
tistically not highly signiﬁcant. The inverse formulation, however, pro-
duced a highly signiﬁcant tax coeﬃcient of 0.11. At lower tax rates, this
2. This work includes Hartman (1981), Boskin and Gale (1987), and Newlon (1987). The
literature on the eﬀects of taxation on foreign direct investment abroad has been carefully
reviewed in Hines (1997). This review does not include the recent work in Grubert and Mutti
(1997), however.
3. Hines and Rice report that 4.2 percent of all property, plant, and equipment is located
in the tax havens in 1982.
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local tax rates from 20 to 10 percent will increase U.S. aﬃliates’ net plant
and equipment in a country by 65 percent.
Hines and Rice (1994) regress the log of PPE on host-country average
tax rates. The coeﬃcient on their tax term is 3.3 and is signiﬁcantly dif-
ferentfrom 0.4Thiscoeﬃcientsuggeststhatattheirmeantaxrateof31per-
cent,a1 percent increase in after-tax returns leads to a 2.3 percent increase
in the real capital stock of U.S. aﬃliates. Hines and Rice’s inclusion of the
tax haven countries, as well as their examining the allocation of capital in
all nonbank aﬃliates, may be responsible for their higher estimated elas-
ticity.
The most recent analysis of the eﬀects of taxes on investment location
decision of U.S. multinational ﬁrms is Grubert and Mutti (1997). They
estimate tax elasticities using country- and ﬁrm-level cross-sectional data
on the manufacturing aﬃliates of U.S. manufacturing parents in sixty loca-
tions from the 1992 U.S. Department of the Treasury tax ﬁle. As in their
previous study, they enter the tax variable in log (1  t)f o r m .
When compared to the results of their previous paper, the estimates
from Grubert and Mutti (1997) suggest that the location of capital may
have become more sensitive to diﬀerences in after-tax returns between
1982 and 1992. Using the aggregated country-level data, they estimate a
tax elasticity that is greater than 3 (for open economies) and is statistically
highly signiﬁcant. Using the ﬁrm-level data, they calculate a combined
elasticity measure that takes into account the probability of choosing to
locate capital in a country and the amount of capital invested into account.
They report a combined elasticity of capital to after-tax returns for open
economies of about 3.
To summarize, the results of previous work with cross-sectional data
indicate that taxes have a signiﬁcant impact on the investment location
decisions of U.S. multinational ﬁrms. In addition, a rough comparison of
the elasticity estimates suggests that these decisions may have become
more sensitive to host-country tax rates in recent years; however, the valid-
ity of this comparison is questionable, since the estimates were derived
from diﬀerent data sources.
1.2 The Data
Our principal source of data is the body of U.S. Department of the
Treasury corporate tax ﬁles compiled by the Statistics of Income (SOI)
4. Hines and Rice (1994) also report results of regressions that include both the tax rate
and the square of the tax rate as explanatory variables. However, the squared tax rate is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
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variety of tax and information forms ﬁled by U.S. parent corporations.
Many of the data necessary for our analysis come from the Form 5471,
which reports on the activities of each CFC of a U.S. parent. This form,
which U.S. parents must ﬁle for each of their CFCs, reports subsidiary-
level information on assets, taxes paid, earnings and proﬁts, and other
information from balance sheets and income statements.
Information from the Form 5471 is compiled only in even years and was
available to us from 1980 through 1992. However, the level of detail re-
corded from this form on the SOI ﬁles diﬀers from year to year. For ex-
ample, both the 1984 and 1992 ﬁles provide information on the com-
position of assets from the balance sheet portion of the Form 5471,
whereas the ﬁles from other sample years do not. The interval from 1984
to 1992 is particularly appropriate for our study, since it covers a period
of large declines in eﬀective tax rates in some locations abroad.5 We use
the information in the remaining even years between 1980 and 1992 to
calculate country average eﬀective tax rates. These eﬀective tax rates are
used in various forms as independent variables in our regressions.
We restrict our sample to the manufacturing CFCs of all large U.S. man-
ufacturing corporations.6 We aggregate the subsidiary-level information
from the Form 5471 across parents by country.7 One advantage of using
country-level data is that such data eliminate some of the complicated sta-
tistical problems associated with subsidiary-level data—for example, the
problems that arise from using data that are truncated at zero when errors
may be correlated across observations within a country because of omitted
variables. A drawback is that we lose information on the characteristics of
the parent corporations that may aﬀect their location decisions.
Aggregating across subsidiaries in each country leaves us with data for
5. This period also straddles that of the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986, which made signiﬁ-
cant changes in U.S. taxation of both domestic and international business. Our analysis con-
siders the choice of investment across foreign locations, not between domestic and foreign
locations. However, we allow the intercept in our estimates to vary by year, which to some
extent may capture the eﬀect of changes in U.S. taxes over the time period. Some evidence
of the responsiveness of foreign investment to changes in U.S. tax rates is provided in Harris
(1993). He ﬁnds that ﬁrms that were most negatively impacted by the 1986 tax reform re-
sponded by increasing their investment abroad.
6. Although beyond the scope of this project, it is possible that the behavior of ﬁrms in
the manufacturing industry diﬀers from those in other industries. As discussed in section
1.1, the diﬀerence between the estimates of the elasticity of property, plant, and equipment
to average host-country tax rates found in Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice
(1994) may be due to the inclusion of nonbank aﬃliates in the latter study. Given the focus
of this paper on the location of real capital, it seemed appropriate to limit the sample to data
from manufacturing aﬃliates.
7. The 1984 sample includes all U.S. corporations with at least one CFC and total assets
greater than $250 million. All U.S. corporations with at least $500 million in assets were
included in the 1992 sample.
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linked” in that there is no requirement that the same parents (or the same
CFCs) appear in both years of data. We also experimented with a sample
drawn from a panel that contains only those CFCs associated with parents
that appear in both years.9 We report results using this linked data set in
our sensitivity analysis.10
We augment the Form 5471 data with country-speciﬁc information from
some other sources to help control for countries’ nontax characteristics
that may aﬀect location decisions. We obtained population, GDP, and in-
ﬂation data from the International Monetary Fund International Financial
Statistics (International Monetary Fund 1984, 1992) supplemented in a
few cases by information from statistics from the United Nations. As in
Grubert and Mutti (1997), we use the trade regime classiﬁcation developed
in the World Development Report (World Bank 1987) to control for the
degree of openness of each country’s economy. This measure is based on
observations from 1973 to 1985 of (1) the country’s eﬀective rate of protec-
tion, (2) its use of direct controls such as quotas, (3) its use of exports, and
(4) the extent of any overvaluation of its exchange rate. The variable runs
from 0 (most open) to 3 (most restrictive). Unfortunately, there is only one
observation of this measure—it has not been updated for the years after
1985.
Before turning to our empirical results, we brieﬂy discuss how we use
the Form 5471 information to calculate eﬀective tax rates and to measure
real capital. Thesevariables are reported in appendix tables1A.1 and 1A.2.
1.2.1 Measuring Assets
Our measure of real capital in each year is composed of end-of-year
depreciable assets (plant and equipment) and inventories from the balance
sheet information reported on the Form 5471. Because parents are re-
quired to report subsidiary assets according to U.S. accounting principles,
these ﬁgures are not distorted by host-country incentives such as acceler-
ated depreciation. However, the asset measures reﬂect historical book val-
ues and therefore may be aﬀected by local inﬂation and exchange rates.11
Another potential problem with our real capital measure is that the
8. Locations for which there were fewer than ﬁve CFCs were eliminated from the analysis.
This left us with sixty locations. Our analysis was further limited to ﬁfty-eight countries
because we were unable to locate complete information for Taiwan and the Cayman Islands.
9. The link is based largely on employer identiﬁcation numbers (EINs), but a special eﬀort
using corporate names was made to identify large companies whose EINs may have changed.
Companies may disappear because of mergers and may appear because they moved over the
threshold for inclusion during our time interval.
10. Our unlinked panel has, however, some advantages over the linked panel. For example,
if a parent disappears due to a merger, the unlinked country totals will contain both the
parent’s 1984 and 1992 assets and income.
11. In some cases the parent may maintain historical values in terms of dollars originally
invested (particularly in locations with hyperinﬂation), but this is not mandated.
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the CFC is incorporated. This problem is especially serious in tax haven
countries, which are often hosts to holding companies and ﬁnancial CFCs.
Including only manufacturing aﬃliates in our country data helps miti-
gate this problem. In addition, we investigate how our results are aﬀected
when we remove countries that are likely to be tax havens from the
analysis.
1.2.2 Measuring Eﬀective Tax Rates
We calculated the average eﬀective tax rate for manufacturing CFCs
incorporated in each country by dividing total income taxes paid by total
earnings and proﬁts.12 Both variables appear on the Form 5471. Parent
corporations must report their CFCs’ earnings and proﬁts using the deﬁ-
nition provided by the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. This measure of earn-
ings and proﬁts is meant to reﬂect net economic income, not host-country
(or domestic U.S.) taxable income, which would be aﬀected by investment
incentives such as accelerated depreciation.13
One potential problem with our country average eﬀective tax rate calcu-
lations, particularly in small countries with few CFCs, is that they appear
to contain noise. We were particularly concerned about the 1984 eﬀective
tax rates. Appendix table 1A.3 reports the results of regressing previous-
year average eﬀective tax rates on 1986 and 1990 average eﬀective tax rates.
We found that the 1982 eﬀective tax rates are better predictors of 1986
eﬀective tax rates than are the 1984 rates. To diminish the role of the 1984
eﬀective tax rates in our analysis, we averaged them with eﬀective tax rates
from the previous two even years. For consistency, we average the 1992
eﬀective tax rates with those from 1990 and 1988. We also experiment with
using lagged eﬀective tax rates.
Another potential problem with our eﬀective tax rate measures is that
they may be correlated with inﬂation, because depreciation allowances are
based on the historic costs of assets. In addition to including inﬂation as
an explanatory variable, we also checked the relation between diﬀerences
in inﬂation and diﬀerences in eﬀective tax rates. We found that the change
in inﬂation between 1984 and 1992 explains less than 4 percent of the var-
iation in our eﬀective tax rate variables.
A further issue is that average eﬀective tax rates are, to some extent,
endogenous to investment decisions. The eﬀective tax rate in a country
12. Only CFCs with positive income were included in the calculation; otherwise, the tax
measure would be biased upward. As indicated, only income taxes are included in the average
eﬀective tax rate measure. However, foreign aﬃliates operating in host countries are some-
times also subject to property and assets taxes. These taxes may also inﬂuence the investment
patterns of U.S. multinationals. Our data do not permit us to identify these taxes.
13. As noted in Grubert and Mutti (1997), earnings and proﬁts on the Form 5471 seem
very close to book income (which is also reported).
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activity in that country that qualiﬁes for investment incentives, such as
accelerated depreciation, that accrue early in an investment’s life.14 One
approach to avoiding this potential endogeneity problem is to replace av-
erage eﬀective tax rates with statutory rates. Although statutory rates have
the virtue of being exogenous to investment decisions, they do not reﬂect
all the variation in the tax advantages of investment in diﬀerent locations
because they do not measure tax base diﬀerences across countries. Statu-
tory rates also do not capture ad hoc deals between host countries and
individual foreign investors. For this reason, statutory rates are better indi-
cators of the advantages of placing ﬁnancial capital in a location and the
gains to income shifting. Nevertheless, we use statutory rates as well as in-
strumental variable techniques to test the sensitivity of our results to alter-
native measures of taxes. We collected country statutory tax rates from the
Price Waterhouse (1984, 1992) guides.
Given that we are implicitly modeling investment decisions, it might
seem appropriate to use host-country marginal eﬀective tax rates rather
than average eﬀective tax rates. Marginal eﬀective tax rates were not avail-
able for many of the countries included in our sample. Even if Hall-
Jorgenson-King-Fullerton marginal eﬀective tax rates as they are usually
modelled were calculated for all the countries and both years in our
sample, it is not clear that they would be superior at capturing the eﬀects
of taxes on investment location decisions. As discussed previously by oth-
ers, there are serious drawbacks to the use of marginal eﬀective tax rates.
For example, taking into account all of the feature of tax systems that are
important for investment decisions in the calculation of marginal eﬀective
rates is generally not feasible. There may be features of tax codes that are
diﬃcult to model (such as the alternative minimum tax in the United
States), tax incentives that apply to only some regions of countries, and ad
hoc deals between companies and host countries. Finally, the formulas
used to compute Hall-Jorgenson-King-Fullerton tax rates are sensitive to
the required rate of return assumed.
The tax variable used in the location equations, the local average eﬀec-
tive tax rate, tends to overstate the cross-country variation in tax burdens,
and thus to understate the true investment elasticity. For one thing, multi-
national corporations can allocate more debt to high (statutory) tax loca-
tions, diluting the impact of the local tax on net equity income. In addi-
tion, the tax variable does not include the residual U.S. tax on repatriations
14. Grubert and Mutti (1997) found that recently incorporated CFCs had signiﬁcantly
lower eﬀective tax rates than the country average in the 1992 ﬁle. To correct for age eﬀects,
they adjust the country average eﬀective tax rates by the age distribution of CFCs in each
country. Their tax elasticity estimates were unaﬀected by this adjustment. Grubert (chap. 5
in this volume) indicates that age eﬀects were the same in 1984 as in 1992.
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out diﬀerences in tax rates across the countries; if a company’s foreign
tax credits do not fully oﬀset its U.S. tax liability on repatriated income,
additional repatriations from a low-tax country trigger an additional U.S.
tax, while repatriations from countries with a tax rate above the U.S. rate
yield a bonus because some of the foreign tax credits can shield other
income (see Grubert and Mutti 1997 for a discussion of this issue).
1.2.3 Variation in Eﬀective Tax Rates across Countries and Time
Our empirical strategy relies on the existence of variation in eﬀective
tax rates across countries and across our time period. Fortunately, this was
a period of intense tax reform activity around the world. Along with the
United States, many countries reduced their corporate tax rates (including
Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands).
These reforms resulted in substantial declines in average eﬀective tax rates
for U.S. CFCs between 1984 and 1992.16
Table 1.1 provides information on the mean and standard deviation of
average eﬀective tax rates (for manufacturing) for the ﬁfty-eight locations
in our data set. The table shows that average eﬀective tax rates in our
sample steadily declined between 1980 and 1992. In addition, the standard
deviation of average eﬀective tax rates was greater than 11 percent in each
year. We also calculated the variation in country average eﬀective tax rates
15. See Altshuler and Newlon (1993) or Grubert (1998) for a detailed description of repa-
triation taxes.
16. Grubert, Randolph, and Rousslang (1996) found that there was a substantial decrease
in the average foreign tax rate faced by U.S. multinationals on repatriated income between
1984 and 1992. They conclude that the decrease in average foreign tax rates (from 36 percent
in 1984 to 25 percent in 1992) was due primarily to reductions in country average eﬀective
tax rates and not to changes in income repatriation patterns.
Table 1.1 Global Decline in Average Eﬀective Tax Rates, 1980–92 (average










Note: The table presents the means and standard deviations of average eﬀective tax rates for
U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries in ﬁfty-eight countries. Average eﬀective tax rates in each
country are calculated by dividing the total income taxes paid by U.S. controlled foreign
corporations in the manufacturing sector by their total earnings and proﬁts.
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fell by more than 10 percentage points between 1984 and 1992. The stan-
dard deviation of the change was 17 percentage points, indicating substan-
tial variation in the change in tax rates.17
1.3 Estimation Results
For our estimates we use a reduced-form model that follows the model
used in Grubert and Mutti (1997) and is similar to the models used in
Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994).The model assumes
that the derived demand for capital by multinational ﬁrms in a country is
a function of after-tax rates of return and exogenous country characteris-
tics that aﬀect supply and demand (such as GDP and GDP per capita).18
This reduced-form relation between tax rates and investment in real capi-
tal would result from a standard partial equilibrium economic model in
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where i indicates countries, subscript t indicates the year of analysis (t 
1984 or 1992), K is real capital, Z is a vector of nontax country characteris-
tics, t is the tax variable, and TRADE is the trade policy variable. Notice
that our tax variable is interacted with the trade variable (which also ap-
pears by itself in the vector Z) to control for the possibility that the beneﬁt
of low tax rates may be smaller in more restrictive trade regimes. Thus, the
estimated coeﬃcient  describes the elasticity of total real capital with
respect to after-tax returns (for a given pretax return), for the most open re-
gimes (in which the trade variable is zero). We use log GDP and log popu-
lation as scale variables to reﬂect the economic size of each country. Since
we use the log form, we are implicitly controlling for diﬀerences in GDP
p e rc a p i t aa c r o s sc o u n t r i e s .
17. As will be explained shortly, we use diﬀerences in eﬀective tax rates averaged over three
years, lagged eﬀective tax rates, and statutory tax rates in our regression analysis. The decline
in eﬀective tax rates averaged over the years 1980, 1982, and 1984, and in eﬀective tax rates
averaged over the years 1988, 1990, and 1992, was 11 percentage points with a standard de-
viation of 12. Average eﬀective tax rates fell by 9.5 percentage points (with a standard de-
viation of 15) between 1982 and 1990. Finally, statutory tax rates fell almost 14 percentage
points between 1984 and 1992 with a standard deviation of 14.
18. We recognize that there may be general equilibrium responses in factor returns that
aﬀect the role of taxes in multinational behavior. As Gordon (1986) shows in a small country
model with homogeneous capital and perfect mobility of portfolio capital, any increase in
the local tax rate on capital is oﬀset by lower local wage costs; but, as discussed in Grubert
and Mutti (1997), many features of a more realistic model would diminish or even reverse
this general equilibrium response. In any case, if the Gordon (1986) model is valid, we should
observe no eﬀect of local taxes on the location of multinational corporations. Indeed, bring-
ing potential U.S. tax credits into the picture would predict that U.S. companies should locate
in high-tax countries.
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1.3.1 Single-Year Cross-Sectional Analysis
Table 1.2 presents our main results.19 The ﬁrst column reports regression
results for the 1992 cross section. We include regional dummies to control
for unmeasured geographic characteristics.20 Our results indicate that the
open regime tax elasticity is 2.7 and is highly signiﬁcant. The trade regime
variable is also highly signiﬁcant and negative, indicating the adverse eﬀect
of trade restrictions on the desirability of a location for investment. As
expected, the presence of trade restrictions lessens the responsiveness to
lower tax rates: The trade-tax interaction term is negative and signiﬁcant
at the 5 percent level. Although we included inﬂation as an independent
variable in other estimates, we do not report these results in the table be-
cause inﬂation rates had no eﬀect on the tax variables and were never a
signiﬁcant explanatory variable.
The analogous regression for 1984 is presented in the second column of
table 1.2. In contrast to the 1992 results, neither the tax term nor the trade-
tax interaction term is signiﬁcant at conventional levels in the 1984 cross
section. In addition, the coeﬃcient on the tax term in the 1984 regression
is (about) half the size of that in the 1992 regression.
Before turning to the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates, we pool the data and test
whether the coeﬃcients on the log(1  t) terms are statistically diﬀerent
from each other in 1984 and 1992. We restrict all of the coeﬃcients except
the ones on log(1  t) terms to be equal; an F-test does not reject this spec-
iﬁcation.
The pooled regression results appear in column (3) of table 1.2. In these
regressions, the tax term (log(1  t)) appears by itself and interacted with
a year variable that equals one in 1984. Therefore the 1992 open economy
elasticity is the coeﬃcient on the log(1  t) term, the interacted term gives
thediﬀerencebetweenthe1984and1992openeconomyelasticities,andthe
sum of the two terms gives the 1984 open economy elasticity. The bottom
two rows of the table report the 1984 and 1992 elasticity estimates with
standard errors.21
Interestingly, in the pooled regression, the 1992 coeﬃcient decreases in
size and signiﬁcance; the opposite is true of the 1984 coeﬃcient, which is
now signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. In addition, the diﬀerence between
the rates, although still large, is not statistically signiﬁcant. Controlling for
country ﬁxed eﬀects will increase the precision of these estimates if our
tax terms are correlated with omitted nontax country variables. To the
19. Since the number and size of CFCs diﬀer across countries in our data set, we report
White-corrected standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity.
20. The excluded countries are a highly heterogeneous group that includes African, Scandi-
navian, and Middle Eastern countries, among others.
21. The standard error comes from the analogous regression in which YEAR84  1f o r
the 1992 observations.Table 1.2 The Eﬀect of Taxes on the Location of Real Capital Abroad by U.S.
Manufacturing Companies (results for cross-sectional, pooled, and ﬁxed
eﬀects regressions)
Dependent Variable
Log of Log of Log of Diﬀerence in
Capital 1992 Capital 1984 Capital Log of Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(1Ave ETR for 1988–92) 2.68**
(.720)






Diﬀerence in log(1Ave ETR) 2.77**
(.744)
TRADE .719** .638* .630**
(.200) (.320) (.183)
TRADE*log(1Ave ETR for 1.14**
1988–92) (.445)






Log GDP, 1992 1.08**
(.104)




Diﬀerence in log GDP .580**
(.163)
Log population, 1992 .223**
(.111)




Diﬀerence in log population .317**
(.139)
Regional dummies
North America 2.04** 1.82** 1.97**
(.269) (.303) (.194)
Latin America 1.18** 1.16** 1.14**
(.253) (.344) (.213)extent that these omitted variables do not vary over time, we can control
for their ﬁxed eﬀects by estimating the model in ﬁrst diﬀerence form.
1.3.2 Controlling for Permanent Nontax
Features of Diﬀerent Locations
As in the pooled regression, we allow the tax coeﬃcients to diﬀer over
time. This gives the following model in diﬀerence form:
(2) const
TRADE
log log ( )
log( ) log( ) 










92 84 92 84




−= + ′ −
+− −−





Asia .289 .159 .200
(.306) (.330) (.219)




Constant 4.01** 3.32** 3.86** .782**
(.539) (.731) (.512) (.188)
Adjusted R2 .860 .755 .826 .327
N 58 58 116 58
1992 Tax Elasticity 2.68** 2.21** 2.77**
(.720) (.691) (.744)
1984 Tax Elasticity 1.32 1.42* 1.53**
(.847) (.741) (.722)
Note: The columns report estimated OLS coeﬃcients. Columns (1) and (2) present estimated coeﬃ-
cients from regressions using cross-sectional data for 1992 and 1984, respectively. Column (3) presents
estimated coeﬃcients using pooled data from the 1984 and 1992 cross sections. Column (4) presents
estimated coeﬃcients from a regression of ﬁrst diﬀerences of the 1984 and 1992 cross-sectional data.
“Ave ETR for 1988–92” is equal to the country average eﬀective tax rate averaged over 1988, 1990, and
1992. “Ave ETR for 1980–84” is equal to the country average eﬀective tax rate averaged over 1980,
1982, and 1984. “Diﬀerence in log(1Ave ETR)” equals “log(1Ave ETR for 1988–92)” minus
log(1Ave ETR for 1980–84).” The dummy variable “YEAR84” equals 1 for 1984. The trade regime
variable, “TRADE,” runs from 0 (most open) to 3 (most restrictive). The bottom panel of the table
reports the tax elasticity estimates from each regression. White-corrected standard errors are in paren-
theses.
*Denotes signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
**Denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Dependent Variable
Log of Log of Log of Diﬀerence in
Capital 1992 Capital 1984 Capital Log of Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)By rearranging this equation as follows we can test directly whether tax




log log ( )
[log( ) log( )]






























where diﬀ  92  84.
The fourth column of table 1.2 presents estimates of equation (3); sum-
mary statistics on the regression variables are presented in appendix table
1A.4. Three main ﬁndings emerge. First, the 1992 elasticity increases sub-
stantially in magnitude (from 2.21 to 2.77).22 Second, the 1984 coeﬃcient
also becomes larger (from 1.42 to 1.53) and is more precisely estimated.23
And ﬁnally, the diﬀerence in elasticities is greater than 1 and is signiﬁcant
at the 5 percent level, indicating that the location of real manufacturing
capital by manufacturing ﬁrms may indeed have become more sensitive to
tax rates.24 These results indicate that the estimates in column (3) may have
been aﬀected by correlation between the tax rate variable and omitted
country characteristics.
Notice that by including a constant term in this regression, we have
assumed that the constant terms in the yearly regressions are not identical.
It is interesting to note that the constant is positive and highly signiﬁcant
(and remains so in all the estimates). Among other things, this term may
be controlling for changes in both tax and nontax factors that aﬀected the
22 Rosanne Altshuler, Harry Grubert, and T. Scott Newlon
22. We can also calculate a weighted elasticity that reﬂects the eﬀects of the trade restric-
tions. Adjusting the elasticity by trade regime using the 1992 real capital stocks as weights
gives a slightly lower tax elasticity of 2.64.
23. To test the signiﬁcance of the 1984 rate we ran the same regression as in equation (3)
but with log(1  ti,92) instead of log(1  ti,84) entered separately. The result is presented in
the last row of table 1.2.
24. Although our estimation results strongly indicate that the tax elasticities are not the
same in our two sample years, we also estimated the ﬁxed eﬀects model that constrains the
tax elasticities to be equal in 1984 and 1992. To do this we simply dropped the 1984 tax term
log(1  ti,84) from the right-hand side of equation (3). The coeﬃcient on the tax term in this
regression was 2.1 (which is the average of the 1984 and 1992 estimated elasticities in column
[4] of table 1.2) and was statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 1 percent conﬁdence level.
The estimated coeﬃcients and standard errors on the trade-tax interaction term and the
population and GDP variables changed insigniﬁcantly. Dropping the trade-tax interaction
variable from the constrained model (regressing the diﬀerence in capital stocks on a constant
term, the diﬀerence in the tax terms, the diﬀerence in population, and the diﬀerence in GDP)
lowered both the magnitude and the signiﬁcance of the tax coeﬃcient (from 2.1 and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level to 1.3 and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level), had little impact on the size or signiﬁcance of the population coeﬃcient estimate, and
increased both the size and signiﬁcance of the GDP coeﬃcient estimate.attractiveness of the United States relative to other countries as a location
for investment.
Apart from globalization, another possible explanation for the increased
tax sensitivity of investment after 1984 is the change in companies’ excess
foreign tax credit expectations as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
which lowered the U.S. rate from 46 to 34 percent. If there were no changes
in behavior by companies or reactions by foreign governments, the number
of companies with excess foreign tax credits would have expanded dramat-
i c a l l y .I fac o m p a n ym o v e si n t oa ne x c e s sc r e d i tp o s i t i o n ,i t se ﬀective tax
burden in a high-tax country goes up because repatriations do not provide
a bonus in terms of usable tax credits, while the eﬀective tax burden in
low-tax countries declines because there is no residual U.S. tax. Therefore,
a large increase in the proportion of parent companies in excess credit
positions could be responsible for the increase in the sensitivity of invest-
ment decisions to after-tax returns over our time period. However, re-
search using data from the tax returns of U.S. multinationals shows about
the same proportion of foreign source income associated with parents in
excess credit positions in 1992 as in 1984. Grubert, Randolph, and Rous-
slang (1996) report that although the fraction of foreign source income
associated with parents in excess credit positions increased from 33 per-
cent in 1984 to 66 percent in 1990, it was only 35 percent by 1992.25 Al-
though there may have been a temporary eﬀect on investment abroad, it
is unlikely that the decrease in the U.S. statutory tax rate plays an impor-
tant role in explaining our results.26 In fact, recent research reported in
Grubert and Mutti (1999) suggests that repatriation taxes play no role in
explaining investment location decisions.
1.3.3 Alternative Speciﬁcations of the Diﬀerence Regression
We experimented with a few diﬀerent speciﬁcations of this regression
that are not reported in the table. As was the case in the previous formula-
tion, including the diﬀerence in inﬂation rates in this regression had no
eﬀect on the tax elasticities. We also tested whether the trade-tax interac-
tion term is diﬀerent in the two time periods by adding the 1984 trade-tax
term. This additional variable had no impact on the tax eﬀects and was
25. The foreign tax credit is calculated separately for diﬀerent types (“baskets”) of foreign
source income. These ﬁgures refer to the percentage of foreign source income in the general
basket associated with excess credit parents. This basket, which accounted for more than 80
percent of foreign source income in 1992, contains income earned through the active conduct
of business abroad. For further details, see Grubert, Randolph, and Rousslang (1996).
26. As mentioned in n. 16, Grubert, Randolph, and Rousslang (1996) conclude from their
investigation of multinational tax returns that decreases in country average tax rates are
largely responsible for the somewhat surprisingly small increase in the portion of foreign
source income held by ﬁrms in excess credit positions. The United States was one of many
countries that enacted corporate tax–lowering reforms in the late 1980s. For example, as
reported in n. 17, we found that statutory tax rates fell by more than 14 percentage points
between 1984 and 1992.
Is U.S. Investment Abroad More Sensitive to Tax Rates? 23not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In addition, we dropped the trade-tax
interaction terms from the regression to determine whether our results are
sensitive to their inclusion.27 Without the trade-tax term, the 1984 elastic-
ity loses its signiﬁcance (at conventional levels) and the magnitude of both
elasticities diminishes slightly: 2.18 for 1992 and .87 for 1984. However,
the 1992 elasticity and the diﬀerence between the elasticities remain highly
signiﬁcant at above the 5 percent level.
As in Hines and Rice (1994), we also entered our average eﬀective tax
rate variables in the linear form. When average eﬀective tax rates appear
on the right-hand side instead of the log of 1 minus the average eﬀective
tax rate, the coeﬃcients on the 1992, 1984,and diﬀerence in tax terms are
4.23, 2.63, and 1.60, respectively. All three terms are statistically dif-
ferent from zero at the 5 percent level or better. At the mean tax rates for
1992 and 1984 given in table 1.1, these coeﬃcients imply that a 1 percent
increase in after-tax returns in a country would increase the real capital
stock held by U.S. aﬃliates in that country by 3.2 percent in 1992 and 1.7
percent in 1984. When squared tax terms are added, their coeﬃcients are
positive, not negative as would be expected if the logarithm speciﬁcation
is exactly correct, but they are not statistically signiﬁcant. There seems to
be greater tax sensitivity at low tax rates than would be suggested by the
log speciﬁcation, but in any case, there does not seem to be much substan-
tive diﬀerence between the double log and semilog speciﬁcations. Given
this fact, we prefer the log speciﬁcation because it yields coeﬃcients that
can be directly interpreted as elasticities.
1.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The remaining two tables test the robustness of the results in column
(4) to diﬀerences in the tax variables (table 1.3) and the sample (table 1.4)
used. In particular, we focus on the signiﬁcance of the two elasticities and
the diﬀerence between them. The results are generally consistent with
those just presented, although the 1984 tax elasticity is not always statisti-
cally signiﬁcant.
In the ﬁrst column of table 1.3, we replace the three-year average eﬀec-
tive tax rates with lagged eﬀective tax rates. This eliminates the noise con-
tained in the 1984 tax rates, but by eliminating the averaging of tax rates
over three years it may also increase the noise in the tax rate variable. Us-
ing lagged tax rates yields a slightly smaller tax coeﬃcient for 1992. Al-
though the diﬀerence between the two tax coeﬃcients is smaller, it is still
statistically diﬀe r e n tf r o mz e r oa ta5p e r c e n tc o nﬁdence level. One pos-
27. We also ran the regression using only the twenty-two countries for which the trade
variable equaled zero. While the diﬀerence between the two estimated elasticities remains
larger than one, the magnitude of the two elasticities decreases slightly. Both the 1992 tax
coeﬃcient and the coeﬃcient on the diﬀerence between tax rates remain signiﬁcant at con-
ventional levels. However, the 1984 tax coeﬃcient loses signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
24 Rosanne Altshuler, Harry Grubert, and T. Scott Newlonsible reason for the decrease in the magnitude of the diﬀerence in elastici-
ties is that the 1988 rates no longer receive any weight in the analysis. Table
1.1 shows that the big drop in rates occurred between 1988 and 1990.
Averaging in 1988 with 1990 and 1992 may have led to an underestimation
of the tax rate change between 1984 and 1992 and an overestimate of the
responsiveness of investment to the change.
As previously discussed, a potential problem with the average eﬀective
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Table 1.3 Sensitivity of Results of Regressions in Diﬀerences to Changes in the Measure of
Tax Rates
Dependent Variable: Log of Capital
in 1992  Log of Capital in 1984
OLS OLS IV
T a xv a r i a b l e sa r el a g g e de ﬀective tax rates (ETR)




Trade*[log(1ETR1990)  log(1ETR1982)] .874**
(.401)
Tax variables are statutory tax rates (t)




Trade*[log(1t1992)  log(1t1984)] .840** .539
(.352) (.576)
Log GDP1992  log GDP1984 .445** .490** .560**
(.165) (.150) (.184)
Log population1992  log population1984 .227* .248** .316
(.129) (.096) (.297)
Constant .775** 1.02** .847**
(.196) (.204) (.277)
Adjusted R2 .309 .315 .265
N 58 58 58
1992 Tax Elasticity 2.40** 1.87** 2.49
(.825) (.734) (1.58)
1984 Tax Elasticity 1.53** .795 1.21
(.640) (.585) (1.54)
Note: Columns (1) and (2) report estimated OLS coeﬃcients. Column (3) reports estimated coeﬃcients
from an instrumental variables regression in which statutory tax rates are used as instruments for coun-
try average eﬀective tax rates (ETRs). The trade regime variable, “TRADE,” runs from 0 (most open)
to 3 (most restrictive). The bottom panel reports tax elasticity estimates from each regression. White-
corrected standard errors for the coeﬃcient estimates in the ﬁrst two columns are in parentheses. The
standard errors in the third column are not White-corrected.
*Denotes signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.tax rates is that they are endogenous to investment decisions. The eﬀective
tax rate in a country may be low in one year because of a recent increase
in investment activity in that country. Using statutory tax rates eliminates
this potential endogeneity problem. At the same time, though, statutory
rates do not capture the eﬀects of tax base diﬀerences across countries.
The second column shows that our qualitative results are unaﬀected by
this measure of taxes—both the 1992 tax elasticity and the diﬀerence in
elasticities are positive and signiﬁcant. However, the 1984 elasticity is no
longer statistically signiﬁcant. Notice that the magnitude of the tax co-
eﬃcients decreases, suggesting that investment location decisions are more
responsive to diﬀerences in average eﬀective tax rates than to diﬀerences
in statutory rates.
An alternative way of addressing the endogeneity problem is to use an
instrumental variables approach. In column (3), we present estimates that
use statutory tax rates as instruments for average eﬀective tax rates. Using
instrumented tax rates had little eﬀect on our coeﬃcient estimates but
increased our standard errors signiﬁcantly. In fact, column (3) shows that
neither elasticity was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at standard levels.
These results suggest that the statutory rates do not adequately capture
the variation in the component of eﬀective tax rates that explain location
choices.
Table 1.4 shows the results of a series of experiments in which we restrict
the sample in diﬀerent ways. To test whether outliers played a signiﬁcant
role in our regressions we restricted the sample to include only countries
with populations greater than 1 million (ﬁfty-six countries), eliminated
countries for which the diﬀerence of three-year average eﬀective tax rates
was greater than 0.35 and less than 0.10 (three countries), and deleted
countries for which the diﬀerence in the log of the capital stocks between
1992 and 1984 was greater than 2 or less than 0.5 (this eliminates the
ﬁve countries in which capital stocks grew more than 700 percent or con-
tracted by more than 40 percent). Column (1) shows that our main ﬁndings
are not the result of activities in tax havens. The elasticities and the diﬀer-
ence between them change little in magnitude or statistical signiﬁcance.
Removing countries with large changes in average eﬀective tax rates from
the sample decreases the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the tax coeﬃ-
cients, although the 1992 elasticity and the diﬀerence betweenthetwoelas-
ticities remain signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level or better (see column [2]).
Countries experiencing large changes in the real capital stocks of U.S. man-
ufacturing aﬃliates have an impact on the magnitude of our tax elasticity
estimates and the diﬀerence between them. However, all three coeﬃcients
are still signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level or better.
Finally, in the last column we report results from the linked panel, which
contains the same parents in both years. This panel contains about two-
thirds of the parents in our unlinked data. Both the 1984 and 1992 elastici-
Is U.S. Investment Abroad More Sensitive to Tax Rates? 27ties and the diﬀerence between them are large and statistically highly sig-
niﬁcant in this panel.
1.4 Conclusion
Measuring the extent to which host-country taxes aﬀect the allocation
of multinationals’ foreign direct investment across foreign jurisdictions has
been an active area of research in international taxation. The most recent
studies indicate that taxes exert a strong inﬂuence on location decisions.
Our estimates, using two years of data from the U.S. Department of the
Treasury tax ﬁles, provide additional evidence that the foreign investment
of manufacturing ﬁrms is sensitive to diﬀerences in host-country tax rates.
Unlike in previous estimates, however, in ours we control for any (perma-
nent) diﬀerences in nontax features of countries that may be correlated
with host-country tax rates.
Our estimates with country ﬁxed eﬀects produce tax elasticities that are
large in magnitude and generally precisely estimated. Our basic estimates
yield an elasticity of real capital to after-tax rates of return of close to 3
in 1992 and about 1.5 in 1984; both are signiﬁcant at standard levels. Com-
paring these elasticities to those estimated from a model in which the two
years of data are simply pooled together without controlling for country
ﬁxed eﬀects shows the importance of taking these eﬀects into account.
Both the 1984 and 1992 elasticities increase in magnitude and in signiﬁ-
cance.
The increase of more than one in the estimated elasticities from 1984 to
1992 also suggests that the allocation of real capital held in manufacturing
aﬃliates abroad by manufacturing parents may have become more sensi-
tive to diﬀerences in host-country taxes in recent years. This would be
consistent with increasing international mobility of capital and globaliza-
tion of production. Controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects is again important, since
the diﬀerence between the 1984 and 1992 elasticities is statistically signiﬁ-
cant when country ﬁxed eﬀects are taken into account, but not otherwise.
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Table 1A.1 Country Average Eﬀective Tax Rates by Year
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
Argentina 0.2121 0.1185 0.0377 0.1134 0.2434 0.0483 0.1539
Australia 0.3715 0.4071 0.4070 0.3718 0.3426 0.3451 0.3222
Austria 0.3548 0.2868 0.3933 0.2347 0.7289 0.2859 0.3258
Belgium 0.4023 0.3457 0.3724 0.3789 0.2895 0.2235 0.2594
Bermuda 0.0904 0.0841 0.0333 0.0221 0.0099 0.0482 0.0706
Brazil 0.3077 0.3004 0.3140 0.2892 0.3297 0.2335 0.1289
Canada 0.3907 0.3594 0.3720 0.3850 0.3434 0.3159 0.3538
Chile 0.3181 0.4124 0.3849 0.1167 0.0900 0.0470 0.0978
China 0.2352 0.2059 0.1640 0.0073 0.1170 0.0529 0.0573
Colombia 0.3100 0.3110 0.3534 0.3526 0.2581 0.2929 0.2912
Costa Rica 0.2718 0.3984 0.3184 0.3465 0.3189 0.0969 0.1203
Denmark 0.3503 0.2244 0.3583 0.4288 0.4478 0.3181 0.3104
Dominican Republic 0.2234 0.3345 0.3099 0.3287 0.0936 0.1582 0.1196
Ecuador 0.1639 0.1895 0.2453 0.2300 0.2851 0.1008 0.1714
Egypt 0.3181 0.3181 0.3239 0.2169 0.1310 0.1948 0.1638
El Salvador 0.2635 0.2427 0.3138 0.2899 0.3194 0.2342 0.2168
Finland 0.4354 0.4701 0.4331 0.3558 0.2214 0.3187 0.1584
France 0.3958 0.4511 0.4367 0.3955 0.3775 0.2977 0.2283
Greece 0.1947 0.3541 0.3422 0.2247 0.2488 0.2570 0.3338
Guatemala 0.3620 0.3183 0.2087 0.2906 0.3845 0.2838 0.1828
Honduras 0.3735 0.3980 0.4396 0.3815 0.4615 0.3538 0.4187
Hong Kong 0.1338 0.1422 0.2032 0.0936 0.1390 0.1178 0.1011
India 0.5629 0.5691 0.5764 0.4029 0.3919 0.3118 0.4364
Indonesia 0.3651 0.3478 0.3695 0.3476 0.2632 0.3105 0.3516
Ireland 0.0800 0.0295 0.0293 0.0342 0.0261 0.0324 0.0579
Israel 0.1814 0.1687 0.0960 0.3299 0.2016 0.0820 0.1021
Italy 0.2861 0.3368 0.3739 0.3623 0.3396 0.3505 0.3256
Jamaica 0.3767 0.3497 0.3245 0.3508 0.3387 0.2744 0.2621
Japan 0.4571 0.5134 0.5265 0.5050 0.5693 0.5201 0.5027
Kenya 0.4106 0.4662 0.4683 0.4592 0.4899 0.4010 0.3585
Luxembourg 0.3363 0.4036 0.4957 0.3380 0.4313 0.2871 0.2160
Malaysia 0.1314 0.1355 0.1717 0.2674 0.0758 0.1394 0.0814
Mexico 0.4346 0.3805 0.3589 0.3011 0.3291 0.3177 0.2766
Morocco 0.5226 0.5029 0.5421 0.4041 0.4908 0.3460 0.4094
Netherlands 0.2997 0.2623 0.1962 0.2012 0.2480 0.2107 0.1789
New Zealand 0.4306 0.4064 0.3926 0.4380 0.3702 0.2094 0.2867
Nigeria 0.4052 0.4006 0.3131 0.4391 0.2855 0.2676 0.1301
Norway 0.2860 0.4188 0.3747 0.3618 0.1703 0.1352 0.2904
Pakistan 0.5365 0.6144 0.4559 0.4397 0.4761 0.4430 0.4367
Panama 0.1527 0.1125 0.2599 0.0763 0.0622 0.0603 0.0918
Peru 0.4170 0.4887 0.4876 0.4131 0.5914 0.1483 0.1544
Philippines 0.3405 0.3345 0.3618 0.3499 0.3499 0.3257 0.3347
Portugal 0.2867 0.3263 0.2519 0.2421 0.2664 0.2849 0.2530
Singapore 0.1705 0.1734 0.0842 0.0256 0.0402 0.0537 0.0565
South Africa 0.2767 0.3703 0.5021 0.2886 0.4361 0.4175 0.4183
South Korea 0.3112 0.4347 0.2062 0.2986 0.3489 0.4477 0.2575
Spain 0.1947 0.2615 0.2836 0.2757 0.2277 0.2669 0.2533
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(continued)Table 1A.2 Real Capital Stock by Year
Capital Stock Capital Stock
(in millions) (in millions)
1984 1992 1984 1992
Argentina 1,536.7 2,101.7 Kenya 54.7 37.9
Australia 4,174.4 8,314.9 Luxembourg 225.3 710.6
Austria 477.3 834.8 Malaysia 493.5 1,587.0
Belgium 2,017.6 6,288.6 Mexico 3,293.0 6,821.4
Bermuda 132.3 533.2 Morocco 30.2 69.2
Brazil 5,091.2 11,288.7 Netherlands 3,735.1 10,566.1
Canada 15,276.0 36,573.3 New Zealand 1,315.9 605.1
Chile 103.1 984.6 Nigeria 58.3 61.5
China 206.7 494.2 Norway 131.4 785.2
Colombia 429.2 975.5 Pakistan 63.7 118.1
Costa Rica 60.5 143.5 Panama 259.4 630.2
Denmark 254.3 725.9 Peru 255.7 108.2
Dominican Republic 12.5 25.5 Philippines 368.5 699.1
Ecuador 91.3 101.9 Portugal 201.1 912.5
Egypt 25.7 96.3 Singapore 719.8 3,598.9
El Salvador 11.3 61.5 South Africa 1,023.7 464.2
Finland 78.3 290.5 South Korea 258.1 1,721.3
France 5,631.0 19,710.1 Spain 4,153.8 7,207.5
Greece 90.2 270.7 Sri Lanka 10.0 11.0
Guatemala 117.9 77.3 Sweden 385.7 2,290.5
Honduras 56.9 86.9 Switzerland 935.0 2,489.0
Hong Kong 242.6 635.6 Thailand 183.9 1,385.3
India 221.5 361.6 Turkey 125.0 584.2
Indonesia 138.2 279.6 United Kingdom 12,632.0 32,970.4
Ireland 470.4 1,513.2 Uruguay 78.5 136.4
Israel 197.8 504.3 Venezuela 946.2 1,138.0
Italy 2,871.4 12,983.0 West Germany 15,176.3 28,909.4
Jamaica 15.6 47.6 Zambia 10.7 15.1
Japan 8,053.9 14,918.9 Zimbabwe 43.8 30.6
Source: Form 5471 information from the U.S. Department of the Treasury tax ﬁles.
Sri Lanka 0.3643 0.5563 0.2963 0.5465 0.5164 0.4409 0.4054
Sweden 0.4404 0.5075 0.5734 0.5550 0.5166 0.2024 0.1669
Switzerland 0.2206 0.2121 0.2062 0.1838 0.1126 0.1538 0.1387
Thailand 0.3843 0.3254 0.3194 0.2828 0.3134 0.1795 0.2465
Turkey 0.5839 0.5628 0.4194 0.4378 0.4223 0.3164 0.2295
United Kingdom 0.2749 0.2713 0.3224 0.3713 0.2664 0.2126 0.1929
Uruguay 0.1837 0.2318 0.3099 0.0809 0.2762 0.1926 0.1897
Venezuela 0.2796 0.2826 0.3376 0.2990 0.3630 0.2211 0.1973
West Germany 0.4409 0.5049 0.5034 0.4793 0.3281 0.3242 0.2893
Zambia 0.4495 0.3950 0.4728 0.3799 0.0842 0.2804 0.2793
Zimbabwe 0.3312 0.3943 0.5231 0.1984 0.5262 0.4092 0.1203
Note: The table reports country average eﬀective tax rates for U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries. Average
eﬀective tax rates in each country are calculated by dividing the total income taxes paid by controlled
foreign corporations in the manufacturing sector by their total earnings and proﬁts. Information on
total income taxes paid and earnings and proﬁts comes from the Form 5471 portion of the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury corporate tax ﬁles.
Table 1A.1 (continued)
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992References
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Boskin, Michael J., and William G. Gale. 1987. New results on the eﬀects of tax
policy on the international location of investment. In The eﬀects of taxation on




Log capital, 1992  log capital, 1984 0.812 0.684
Log(1  Ave ETR for 1980–84) 0.421 0.178
Log(1  Ave ETR for 1988–92) 0.315 0.159
Log(1Ave ETR for 1988–92) 
log(1Ave ETR for 1980–84) 0.106 0.126
Log population, 1992  log population, 1984 0.153 0.255
Log GDP, 1992  log GDP, 1984 0.660 0.484
TRADE 1.160 1.150
TRADE*[log(1Ave ETR for 1988–92) 
log(1Ave ETR for 1980–84)] 0.155 0.270
Note: “Ave ETR” is the country average eﬀective tax rate. “Ave ETR for 1988–92” is equal
to the country average eﬀective tax rate averaged over 1988, 1990, and 1992. “Ave ETR for
1980–84” is equal to the country average eﬀective tax rate averaged over 1980, 1982, and
1984. The trade regime variable, “TRADE,” runs from 0 (most open) to 3 (most restrictive).
Table 1A.3 Tax Rate Regression Showing Noise in 1984 Eﬀective Tax Rate
Dependent Variable













Adjusted R2 .604 .553
N 58 58
Note: The columns report estimated ordinary least squares (OLS) coeﬃcients. Standard er-
rors are in parentheses. ETR  eﬀective tax rate.
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Comment Jack M. Mintz
A Eulogy for the Use of Average Tax Rates in Investment Equations
In recent years, there has been considerable eﬀort to model the impact
of taxation on the location of investment. These eﬀorts have included
Jack M. Mintz is the Arthur Andersen Professor of Taxation at the Rotman School of
Management, University of Toronto.
32 Rosanne Altshuler, Harry Grubert, and T. Scott Newloncountry cross section and time series studies looking at how taxes impact
the investment decisions of ﬁrms. Two examples of quite diﬀerent ap-
proaches include Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1996) and Hartman
(1984) (see also the survey by Hines 1996). The ﬁrst uses publicly available
data but models the capital decision of the ﬁrm based on a cost of capi-
tal—taxes are incorporated following the Jorgenson-Hall approach. The
second example uses reduced-form equations that look at capital decisions
on a more aggregated level (by country), with decisions being related to
proxies for the return on capital and the average rate of tax (taxes divided
by proﬁts of the ﬁrm).
The paper by Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon is an ambitious study that
follows the approach of Grubert and Mutti (1997). It has the advantage of
using a rich source of data that provide values of capital, taxes, and proﬁts
of U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries operating in close to sixty countries,
spanning the years 1980 to 1992. The authors regress investment on aver-
age tax rates that are measured as corporate income taxes divided by book
proﬁts. In my comments I will provide a brief overview of the econometric
model and, thereafter, a critique of the use of average tax rates in invest-
ment equations.
The Basic Econometric Model
The econometric model presented in the paper is a parsimonious ﬁxed
eﬀects model. It involves regressing the aggregated manufacturing capital
stock of a country on tax rate variables, a single-year measure of the open-
ness of the economy, GDP, and regional dummies. Most of the variables
had their expected eﬀects on the location of capital.
Rather than try to estimate the impact of taxes on each ﬁrm, the authors
choose to aggregate data to the country level. It should be noted, however,
that it is somewhat unclear whether a link exists between GDP and manu-
facturing capital stock if industrial structure diﬀers across countries. To
the extent that GDP is a poor proxy of the output eﬀect on the demand
for manufacturing capital, this may give the average tax rate variable a
greater role in the results than appropriate. Moreover, the concentration
on manufacturing is a bit unfortunate since, in many countries, resource
and service sectors are quite important and country tax systems reﬂect a
particular industrial structure.
The variable capturing openness of the economy is not signiﬁcant. I
suspect that this results from the use of one year of data derived from a
World Bank study when many countries throughout the 1980s and early
1990s substantially improved their openness, particularly in Latin Amer-
ica. Another approach would have been to use the diﬀe r e n c ei nar e a lr a t e
of interest comparable to the U.S. real rate (for example, bank loan rates
that are obtainable from International Monetary Fund publications). This
variable could be viewed as a measure of risk or credit market ineﬃ-
ciencies.
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elasticities of more than 2, is rather surprising, given the level of aggrega-
tion. Studies that tend to aggregate data in the cost of capital literature of-
ten tend to ﬁnd lower numbers, if at all signiﬁcant. I believe that the strong
tax eﬀects on investment obtained from these studies result from unwel-
come dependency of average tax rates on investment.
Endogeneity of Average Tax Rates
I have been critical of the use of average tax rates for investment equa-
tions in the past because the tax rates are endogenous to the investment
decision. Higher investment or growth in capital stocks result in lower
average tax rates, assuming that the statutory tax rate is greater than the
average tax rate and that tax writeoﬀs for capital are greater than the eco-
nomic costs of replacing capital. Therefore, in periods of sustained growth
rates for ﬁrms, industries, or countries, average tax rates tend to fall when
investment increases provided the previous two assumptions hold (and
vice versa if the converse holds). The authors wisely anticipated this criti-
cism and therefore used a number of proxies to avoid this endogeneity—
these proxies included the statutory tax rates and a tax rate averaged for
a period.
These attempts to deal with the limitations of average tax rates are im-
portant. Nonetheless, as discussed below, the average tax rates measured
for a host country still are truly limited in application, and I will now
discuss these issues more fully.
Complexities of Tax Systems and Limitations
for the Use of Average Tax Rates
Trying to understand the corporate tax system for one country is diﬃcult
enough. Capital is aﬀected not only by corporate income taxes but by a
host of other taxes on capital—asset or net worth taxes (as is Canada,
Germany, and Italy, for example), sales taxes on capital inputs (Canada
and the United States), property taxes, and minimum taxes on proﬁts,
assets, turnover, or dividends. Although research has concentrated on the
corporate income tax in that it is the largest tax, this is not the case in
many countries. For example, in Canada, businesses in 1995 paid close
to $19 billion in capital and property taxes and $18 billion in corporate
income taxes.
Tax provisions require taking into account rates of tax and detailed as-
pects of the base, including the treatment of inventory costs, depreciation,
interest expense (such as thin capitalization ratios), and losses. The treat-
ment of losses for tax purposes is very important—a proﬁtable corporation
may not be paying tax at a point in time because of either current fast
writeoﬀs in the tax system or of using up a bank of past losses reﬂecting
past policies and economic circumstances. Thus, the average tax rate, once
34 Rosanne Altshuler, Harry Grubert, and T. Scott Newlonaggregated across ﬁrms, depends not only on current but also on past
tax policy.
More complicated is the relationship between tax systems at the interna-
tional level. A host country’s tax rate inﬂuences not only U.S. investments
but also the U.S. tax regime. Some of the prominent features include the
following:
● The average tax rate for a particular country is not independent of
other tax systems because U.S. tax considerations will aﬀect the tim-
ing and source of remissions. A U.S. corporation pays tax on income
remitted to the United States net of foreign tax credits abroad, and
the average tax rate plays a role in determining the amount of the
foreign tax credit. Although the United States uses a global tax credit
and allows companies to aggregate sources of remitted income and
foreign tax credits, restrictions are in place that limit the degree to
which this is available, as in the case of interest from high-tax coun-
tries. These restrictions apply diﬀerently across countries and are fur-
ther complicated by withholding tax regimes and thin capitalization
and other rules in the host country. Generally, however, a ﬁrm can
manipulate its credits by changing its remissions of types of income
to the parent from abroad (Altshuler and Newlon [1993]). For ex-
ample, when remitting dividends with excess credits, the parent can
simultaneously remit other charges deductible from income in the
host country to eliminate excess tax credits and to avoid paying U.S.
tax on income.
● Average tax rates will depend on past and current policies to remit
income from subsidiaries to the U.S. parent. Prior to 1986, the foreign
average tax rate could be blown up in years of remitting income by
avoiding certain deductions (for example, losses, discretionary capital
cost allowances, or tax credits) that would result in lower average tax
rates during that year. The following year, the deductions would be
claimed if no income was to be remitted, thereby lowering the average
tax rate. After 1987, eligible earnings and proﬁts and the foreign tax
credit became related to accumulated earnings and taxes paid over
time, thereby reducing the scope for manipulating tax credits and av-
erage tax rates in this manner.
● An average tax rate in the host country does not capture the full im-
pact of a subsidiary’s decision on the taxes paid by the multinational.
United States laws are complicated by allocation rules that could re-
sult in the allocation of certain costs to foreign source income—espe-
cially interest expense—thereby aﬀecting the amount of U.S. tax paid
on income earned in the United States. These rules, which require
companies to allocate interest expense according the share of foreign
to worldwide assets, became more stringent after 1986. Under alloca-
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rate in the host country as well as the U.S. tax rate on domestic in-
come, as has been discussed (Altshuler and Mintz 1994).
● Average tax rates of a host country will also depend on the tax plan-
ning decisions of multinationals that link foreign tax considerations
across a number of countries. Multinationals often use planning tech-
niques, especially with respect to interest expense “double dipping,”
that can result in a reduction of both foreign and U.S. taxes. With
multiple deductions for interest and other expenses, both U.S. and
foreign taxes can be reduced, resulting in a lower eﬀective tax rate in
both host and home countries. Some of these arrangements have been
facilitated by such past U.S. actions as the provision of limited liability
partnership status. On the other hand, the United States in the past
few years has aggressively limited some of these schemes that result
in the reduction of U.S. and foreign taxes. Recent changes to the treat-
ment of active and passive income, including the new “check-the-
box” rules, will have a diﬀerent impact on tax planning that is not yet
fully known.
The Pitfalls of Using Average Tax Rates for Empirical Work
The previous discussion illustrates only some of the complications in the
foreign and U.S. tax regimes that make one skeptical about using average
corporate income tax rates in a host country to determine the impact of
tax on investment. More speciﬁcally, I would suggest that the results in
the paper by Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon may be overstated for the
following possible reasons:
1. Investment depends on other features of a host country’s tax system
besides the corporate income tax. One does not know if the inclusion of
other taxes might have resulted in better or less precise estimates (elasticit-
ies could be lower in value as a result). For example, there is not a signif-
icant diﬀerence between U.S. and Canadian manufacturing corporate in-
come tax provisions—the corporate income tax rates and the present value
of tax depreciation rates are similar. However, Canadian average tax rates
on manufacturing are higher than those found in the United States, once
capital taxes, sales tax on capital inputs, and property taxes are included
in the comparison.
2. The average corporate income tax rate for a host country does not
take into account the impact of the subsidiary’s decisions on corporate
income taxes paid by the United States on investments abroad or in the
United States. As remarked earlier, the interest allocation rules alone and
international double-dipping arrangements are examples whereby the sub-
sidiary’s investment decision can impact other taxes paid, not just those
to the host country. Also, when the parent is in a deﬁcient tax credit posi-
tion, the parent’s taxes on remitted income will be aﬀected by the subsid-
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rate that incorporates the eﬀects of both host and other taxes paid by
the U.S. multinational. The bias introduced by leaving out the impact of
subsidiary decisions on the overall taxes paid by the multinational is not
clear.
3. There seems to be no incorporation of the dramatic changes in the
U.S. treatment of foreign income since 1986, including interest allocation
rules and foreign tax credit limitations. One would have expected these
rules to result in a reduction of foreign tax credits as indicated by the
data. I would suspect that parents with excess credits in 1986 would have
responded diﬀerently and tried to reduce their average tax rates abroad.
This and other factors such as leveraged buyouts in the United States
could have resulted in a divestment of capital investment and remissions
to the parent (thereby resulting in an increasingly negative correlation be-
tween average tax rates and capital). Moreover, prior to 1986, many com-
panies, when remitting income back to the U.S. parent, often reduced their
reliance on capital investment abroad and blew up their average tax rates
in those years. The average corporate income tax rate measure for a host
country therefore may overstate the negative correlation between capital
investment and taxes.
4. The aggregation of taxes and proﬁts in a country masks the role of
tax losses in aﬀecting investment decisions. Since losses have a value in re-
ducingtaxesatsomepointthroughlosscarryforwards(assumingthatcarry-
backs have already been reﬂected in tax payments), the average tax rate
may be overstated in a particular year because taxes should be reduced by
the reduced taxes of other years. This is particularly important for cycles—
during downturns, when investment slows down, average tax rates aggre-
gated across ﬁrms tend to rise, and during upturns, average tax rates tend
to be lower when losses are being written oﬀ. Although the authors use
time-averaged or lagged eﬀective tax rates, it would seem that the 1982,
1990, and 1992 eﬀective tax rates are somewhat high and that a bias may
be introduced exaggerating the eﬀects of taxes on investment.
5. Many studies of foreign investment suggest that the anticipated
changes in exchange rates can have a signiﬁcant impact on investment. If
a host country’s exchange rate is expected to devalue, investment decisions
could be discouraged while an anticipated revaluation would attract more
capital. If a country’s exchange rate declines, a parent may choose to re-
duce capital expenditures and remit more dividends out of the country for
several years—average tax rates may rise during a period when income
is remitted.
Conclusion
As I have tried to illustrate, the use of average corporate income tax
rates for a host country in an investment equation may result in a biased
estimate of the impact of taxes on investment. The foremost problem is
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that tend to overstate the impact of taxes on investment. Moreover, many
institutional features of the tax system are not incorporated in the measure
of the average tax rate. These include the impact of losses in aﬀecting the
value of taxes paid in the host country or abroad, the eﬀect of timing of
remissions to the parent on average tax rates, and other tax-planning
schemes.
The alternative for investment studies is to use the eﬀective tax rate on
marginal investments, which may be deﬁned as the amount of tax paid on
income earned by the last unit of capital held by the ﬁrm. Marginal eﬀec-
tive tax rates, in principle, can be derived from a theoretical model that
incorporates most of the important features of corporate tax systems, in-
cluding minimum taxes, tax losses, capital taxes, and home-country taxes
on remitted earnings. Theoretically, the marginal eﬀective tax rate is a su-
perior measure because it better characterizes the eﬀect of taxes on capital
decisions. However, one could criticize this tax rate measure since it is
often diﬃcult to obtain data to incorporate important institutional fea-
tures in estimates of marginal eﬀective tax rates; yet one should not jump
to the conclusion that average tax rates are necessarily any better than
marginal eﬀective tax rates. If a complete set of data were available, it
would seem that the marginal eﬀective tax rate is clearly the appropriate
statistic to use in an investment equation.
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